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In the twenty-first century digital economy, more user data
means more money, power, and dominance. Big tech companies like
Facebook and Google have historically exploited user data to become
the powerhouses they are today. Around the world, countries are
trying to regulate these mega-companies using a common strategy:
competition enforcement. Unfortunately, the United States is not as
well equipped for this fight as the European Union and Germany.
While the European Union and Germany have implemented laws
that directly address data privacy and big tech competition, the
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framework that dates back over a century. This Note argues that the
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concerns and by changing the requirement that US antitrust
enforcers must define a common relevant market to succeed in an
antitrust action. The fight against big tech has just begun, and the
United States needs the correct tools going forward.
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INTRODUCTION: THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY &
ANTITRUST

The digital economy1 is a space often defined by conflict.
Fights often erupt between internet users in comment sections,2

1. This Note defines “digital economy” as the infrastructure needed for the internet
to exist and operate, digital transactions that take place using the internet, and content
that digital economy users create and access. See Kevin Barefoot et al., Defining and
Measuring the Digital Economy, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 6-7 (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2018-4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EG6C2GG9].
2. See generally Tauriq Moosa, Comment Sections Are Poison: Handle with Care or
(Sept.
14,
2014,
7:04
AM),
Remove
Them,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/science/brain-flapping/2014/sep/12/commentsections-toxic-moderation [https://perma.cc/82SB-MAW8].
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between consumers and companies in court rooms,3 and between
CEOs and US Senators on the Senate floor.4 In 2021, the world
watched as two tech giants—Apple’s Tim Cook and Facebook’s5
Mark Zuckerberg—battled one another in real time over a
software update that addressed privacy concerns.6
In April 2021, Apple unveiled a software update that can
heavily restrict an app developer’s ability to share user data with
third parties, such as advertisers.7 Once installed on a person’s
iPhone or iPad, the update will prompt a pop-up notification to
appear when the user opens an app—for example, Facebook.8 The
notification asks if the user would like to allow the app developer
to “track your activity across other companies’ apps and
websites.”9 Then, the user has the opportunity to opt out of data
tracking, which apps like Facebook use to produce targeted ads.10
The ability to opt out of data tracking subverts the way that
many “free” apps make money. While an account holder does not
have to pay a fee to use an app like Facebook, its services come with
a price. In reality, advertisers pay the bills in the digital economy,11
and access to personal data allows them to stretch the value of

3. See Bob Egelko, Class-action Suit Against Facebook for Selling Personal Information
Allowed to Go Forward, S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2021, 5:18 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/us-world/us/article/Class-action-suit-against-Facebookfor-selling-16045273.php [https://perma.cc/6HZB-ULAP].
4. See CNET Highlights, Klobuchar Hits Zuckerberg HARD: Political Ads and Election
Fake News, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFLv9ozEZeM
[https://perma.cc/DE35-DMDF].
5. Since this Note was written, Facebook’s parent company has changed its name to
Meta. This Note uses Facebook to refer to both the social media platform (i.e. the mobile
app and the website) and the parent company.
6. See Scott Ikeda, Why Is Facebook Suddenly Bullish on the Apple Privacy Update?, CPO
MAG. (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/why-is-facebooksuddenly-bullish-on-the-apple-privacy-update/ [https://perma.cc/3W3N-CJDW].
7. Brian X. Chen, To Be Tracked or Not? Apple is Now Giving Us the Choice., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
26,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/technology/personaltech/apple-app-trackingtransparency.html [https://perma.cc/KLC3-X8DP].
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. For example, in its 2017 financial report, Facebook said: “We generate
substantially all of our revenue from selling advertising placements to marketers.” Callum
Borchers, Would You Pay $18.75 for Ad-Free Facebook?, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/14/would-you-pay-1875-for-ad-free-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/43BJ-NVM8].
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their dollars.12 Over time, tech companies like Facebook and
Google have become remarkably adept at presenting users with
ads that they are likely to click on.13 These platforms know exactly
what a user wants to see because they track the user’s every move
on the web.14 Apple’s new privacy update allows iOS users to close
the blinds on their ever-present digital stalker. As a result,
Facebook executives predict that the company’s sales revenue will
decrease by about ten billion dollars in 2022.15
This big tech business model has turned personal data into a
valuable commodity. While data points are not tangible products,
the ways that data is sourced, sold, and bought implicate classic
antitrust and consumer protection issues.16 From a purely
economic angle, there are outstanding questions about the effect
that data collection has on competition. For example, whether
access to data is a barrier to entry into a market and how regulation
impacts innovation.17 From a consumer protection point of view,
there are questions about whether data collection is ethical,18 or if

12. Personal data allows advertisers to tailor ads to specific users, often at a lower
cost than traditional advertising. See Spandana Singh, Special Delivery: How Internet
Platforms Use Artificial Intelligence to Target and Deliver Ads, NEW AMERICA (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/special-delivery/the-growth-of-todaysdigital-advertising-ecosystem [https://perma.cc/AFX7-MJDA].
13. These companies have become so good at ad personalization that they create
echo chambers, which are “feedback loops that reaffirm and narrow an individual’s
thoughts and beliefs.” Joseph Jerome, Big Data: Catalyst for a Privacy Conversation, 48 IND.
L. REV. 213, 220 (2014).
14. See Brian X. Chen & Daisuke Wakabayashi, You’re Still Being Tracked on the
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
2022),
Internet,
Just
in
a
Different
Way,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/technology/online-tracking-privacy.html
[https://perma.cc/UWA4-EY45].
15. See Kif Leswing, Facebook Says Apple iOS Privacy Change Will Result in $10 Billion
(Feb.
2,
2022,
7:54
PM),
Revenue
Hit
This
Year,
CNBC
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/02/facebook-says-apple-ios-privacy-change-will-cost10-billion-this-year.html [https://perma.cc/YGF3-73AK].
16. See A.B.A., Antitrust Law Section, Report of the Task Force on the Future of
Competition L. Standards 9, 12 (2020) [hereinafter ABA Report].
17. See Alexis J. Gilman & Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust – Antitrust Enforcement Poly for
MORING
(Feb.
27,
2019),
Big
Data?
Stay
Tuned.,
CROWELL
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Articles/Antitrust-AntitrustEnforcement-Policy-for-Big-Data-Stay-Tuned [https://perma.cc/B4ZP-FK89].
18. See Karin Clark et al., Advancing the Ethical Use of Digital Data in Human Research:
Challenges and Strategies to Promote Ethical Practice, 21 ETHICS AND INFO. TECH. 59, 60
(2019).
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consumers even care at all.19 While this is not the first time that
competition and consumer protection concerns have overlapped,20
there is no clear answer about how the two should interact.
Questions concerning the relationship between competition
and data privacy are particularly interesting because they are
emerging simultaneously and globally.21 iPhone users everywhere
are downloading the same software update and seeing the same
notification upon opening the Facebook app.22 This Note analyzes
how three different jurisdictions have handled competition in big
data thus far and uses Facebook as a case study to predict the
future of the field. Part II provides an overview of competition
enforcement in three different jurisdictions: the United States, the
European Union, and Germany.23 In the United States, data
19. Compare Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused, and
Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacyconcerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
[https://perma.cc/7FHP-J6TV] (finding that a majority of Americans are concerned about
how companies use their data and believe that the risks of data collection outweigh the
benefits), with Daniel Castro & Michael McLaughlin, Survey: Few Americans Willing to Pay
FOR
DATA
AND
INNOVATION
(Jan.
16,
2019),
for
Privacy,
CTR.
https://datainnovation.org/2019/01/survey-few-americans-willing-to-pay-for-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/Z2FX-FWU3] (finding that a majority of Americans who report that
they would like big tech companies to collect less of their personal data would not be
willing to pay a fee in exchange for less data collection).
20. Consumer protection law and competition law are both tools used to fight
distortion in the marketplace. See Julie Brill, The Intersection of Consumer Protection and
Competition in the New World of Privacy, 7 COMPETITION PRIV. INT’L 7, 8-9 (2011). Generally,
consumer protection offenses distort the demand side of a transaction by eroding trust in
the marketplace, while antitrust offenses artificially distort supply. Id. at 9. However, this
supply and demand distinction is not always clear. Id. Some conduct can negatively impact
both individual consumers and an industry as a whole. Id. While data privacy lends itself
to the intersection of consumer protection and competition, they can also converge in the
context of more traditional widgets. See id. at 14.
21. See Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers, Taking Aim at Big Tech, Push Sweeping Overhaul of
TIMES
(June
11,
2021),
Antitrust,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/technology/big-tech-antitrust-bills.html
[https://perma.cc/YZ9K-F7DH].
22. See Chen, supra note 7.
23. Although Germany is an EU member state, it is still considered a separate
jurisdiction with its own set of national laws. All EU member states, include Germany, lack
jurisdiction to legislate where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union grants
the European Union “exclusive competence,” but they may legislate where the European
Union and national governments share competence, or where the European Union only
has supporting or special competence. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union arts. 3-6, May 9, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter
TFEU].
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concerns are beginning to appear in antitrust enforcement
actions,24 but it is unclear if the country’s century-old antitrust
laws are equipped to handle them. However, Congress is aware of
these growing concerns and has taken steps to draft new antitrust
legislation for the twenty-first century.25
In the European Union, enforcers must balance competition
regulation with data protection. Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) provide
European competition regulators with the necessary tools to tackle
big tech,26 but any action must also comply with the General Data
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), the European Union’s
comprehensive data protection regime.27 While the goals of
competition enforcement and privacy regulation can be
complementary, they can also be at odds. Finally, Germany has
recently passed one of the world’s most comprehensive laws
regulating the digital economy.28 However, as an EU Member State,
German national laws may be subject to EU approval.29
24. For example, the FTC issued a record-breaking $5 billion fine and unprecedented
operation restrictions against Facebook for violating users’ privacy in 2019. See Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy
Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/9PVG-33CA].
25. See Kang, supra note 21; Makena Kelly, Senators Roll Out Bipartisan Data Privacy
Bill, VERGE (May 20, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/2021/5/20/22444515/amyklobuchar-data-privacy-protection-facebook-state-laws
[https://perma.cc/7TWWNWFD].
26. See TFEU, supra note 23, at 101-02.
27. See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation) O.J. (L
127) [hereinafter GDPR].
28. See Jenny Gesley, Germany: New Digital Competition Act Expands Abilities of
Competition Authorities to Regulate Abuse of Dominant Market Positions, LIBR. OF CONG.
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-02-23/germanynew-digital-competition-act-expands-abilities-of-competition-authorities-to-regulateabuse-of-dominant-market-positions/ [https://perma.cc/3ZFK-8QGX].
29. Germany is bound by the European law that it has formally adopted, such as the
General Data Privacy Regulation. See Hunton Andrews Kurth, German Federal Parliament
Passes New German Data Protection Act, HUNTON PRIVACY BLOG (Apr. 28, 2017),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/04/28/german-federal-parliament-passesnew-german-data-protection-act/ [https://perma.cc/MFZ9-KJVB]. It also lacks
jurisdiction to legislate where the TFEU has granted the EU “exclusive competence.” See
TFEU, supra note 23, arts. 3-6. However, the scope of the supremacy of European law is
tenuous. See Sharifullah Dorani, The Supremacy of EU Law Over German Law: EU Law vs
National Law, 7 POL. REFLECTION 44, 52 (2021). In fact, a German court rejected a decision
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Part III explores how each jurisdiction’s competition
enforcement works in practice, using Facebook as a case study. The
United States, European Union, and Germany have all
independently launched probes into Facebook that implicate both
competition and its data practices. Additionally, the United States
and Germany have taken legal action against the company.30 In the
United States, a lawsuit filed against Facebook by the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) introduces some of Facebook’s data
practices as proof that Facebook has engaged in anticompetitive
conduct.31 In recent years, the EC has launched two investigations
into whether the company’s data practices have harmed
competitors, including competitors in secondary markets.32
Finally, Germany issued its own sanctions against Facebook,33
independent of the EC, after its Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) found
that Facebook’s data practices harmed users directly by collecting
users’ data and assigning non-Facebook data to users’ Facebook
accounts.34
Part IV considers the future of big tech competition regulation
by analyzing US legislation that would update its antitrust regime
from the European Court of Justice in 2021, further bringing into question the supremacy
of EU law. See Germany Rebuffs EU Legal Move Against Germany Over ECB Ruling, REUTERS
(Aug. 10, 2021, 9:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-germanyecb/germany-rebuffseu-legal-move-against-germany-over-ecb-ruling-idUSKBN2FB1AH
[https://perma.cc/CE6E-HZGS].
30. See Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 2020) [hereinafter
FTC Complaint]; Schechner et al., EU Deepens Antitrust Inquiry into Facebook’s Data
Practices, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:00 AM); Press Release, European Commission,
Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation into Possible Anticompetitive Conduct of
Facebook
(June
4,
2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2848
[https://perma.cc/34NL-G4ZA]; Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt
Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different Sources (July 2, 2019),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019
/07_02_2019_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/CRD9-2EYN] [hereinafter German
Facebook Enforcement].
31. See FTC Complaint, supra note 30 at 8, 12-14. While the complaint implicates
privacy concerns, the FTC’s theory of the case focused on anticompetitive acquisitions and
conditional dealing policies.
32. See Schechner et al., supra note 30; European Commission, supra note 30.
33. Facebook appealing these sanctions, claiming that it complies with the GDPR. See
Matthias Inverardi, German Court Turns to Top European Judges for Help on Facebook Data
(Mar.
24,
2021,
11:39
AM),
Case,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/german-court-turns-top-european-judgeshelp-facebook-data-case-2021-03-24/ [https://perma.cc/JSR9-7KC6].
34. See German Facebook Enforcement, supra note 30.
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to better regulate the modern digital economy. The legislation
proposed in Congress tackles two areas where the European Union
is better equipped than the United States to tackle big tech
antitrust concerns: addressing harm that a monopolist inflicts in a
secondary market and codifying data privacy as a consumer
welfare concern. While no competition enforcement scheme is
perfect, if passed, the proposed legislation would bring the United
States into the twenty-first century.
II. COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AROUND THE WORLD
A.

United States: Old Laws Face New Problems
1. Antitrust Legal Framework

The US antitrust regime existed long before personal data
became the commodity and concern that it is today. The United
States passed its first federal antitrust law in 1890 with the
Sherman Act.35 The statute was passed to curb the concentration
of wealth in large, unregulated industries, such as steel and
railroads.36 Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes “[e]very
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade”37 and
Section 2 makes monopolization and attempted monopolization a
felony.38 In 1914, the United States passed two more antitrust
statutes, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act, to
fill perceived gaps in antitrust regulation and enforcement.39 The
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act created the FTC to enforce
a ban on “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices,”40 while the Clayton Act, in relevant part,
regulates mergers.41
Although the text of the Sherman Act proscribes “every”
contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and
provides that “every” person who monopolizes or attempts to
35. ALDEN F. ABBOTT, US ANTITRUST LAWS: A PRIMER 1 (Mercatus Ctr. George Mason
Univ. ed., 2021).
36. Id. at 1-2.
37. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
38. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
39. ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 3.
40. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
41. Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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monopolize is guilty of a felony,42 over time the Supreme Court of
the United States has stepped in to outline the contours of the word
“every.”43 In Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States,
the Court held that “every” restraint of trade only includes
unreasonable restraints of trade.44 While some arrangements are
so outrageous as to be per se illegal, most Section 1 claims are
analyzed on a case-by-case basis using the “rule of reason” test.45
Under a rule of reason analysis, the court balances the harm
resulting from the alleged anticompetitive conduct with
procompetitive justifications for the action offered by the
defendant.46 The action is considered unreasonable only if the
harm outweighs the business justifications.47 Similarly, merely
possessing a monopoly in a particular market is not enough to be
guilty of a Sherman Act Section 2 violation.48 Rather, the company
must engage in exclusionary conduct so as to preclude potential
competitors from legitimately challenging the monopolist’s
position.49 In short, in the United States, exclusionary conduct or
monopolization of a market is generally not illegal on its face.
Conduct most likely will not be deemed illegal by the courts
without concrete proof of harm.
Judicial activism has also played a role in US antitrust
enforcement since its inception.50 While the laws have largely
stayed the same throughout the last century, the goals of antitrust
legislation have shifted, as have the ways that judges approach
antitrust claims.51 The initial concern of economic competition—
protecting small businesses from large trusts—has evolved into
42. See Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
43. See Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
44. See id. at 64.
45. See ABBOTT, supra note 35, at 2.
46. See id.
47. See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 ANTITRUST 50, 51 (2019).
48. See Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, DEP’T OF JUST. ARCHIVES (last updated Mar. 18, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conductunder-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-1 [https://perma.cc/C68M-DPJM].
49. Id.
50. See Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911).
While the Supreme Court found Standard Oil guilty of an antitrust violation, the Court
made a policy decision that was not included in the text of the Sherman Act by reading
“every” restraint of trade to only mean “unreasonable” restraints of trade.
51. See Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Welfare Standards
Underlying Antitrust Enforcement: What You Measure is What You Get (Feb. 15, 2019).
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concern about economic efficiency, which means offering
consumers the best products for the lowest prices.52 Since the
1970s, the United States has approached antitrust enforcement
through the lens of the Consumer Welfare Standard.53 While the
exact definition of the Consumer Welfare Standard is somewhat
amorphous,54 the primary takeaway is that concentration of
wealth is not per se negative.55 Some firms gain dominance through
efficient business practices that should not necessarily be
condemned.56 Thus, the Consumer Welfare Standard traditionally
suggests that courts should consider social and political factors,
along with economic factors, when considering the market impact
of allegedly anticompetitive conduct.57
There is an ongoing conversation about how the Consumer
Welfare Standard and antitrust enforcement should handle data
and data privacy concerns.58 From a consumer welfare
perspective, it is debatable whether users actually care about data
privacy, as highlighted by the “privacy paradox.”59 Internet users
claim they disapprove of companies tracking their data; however,
these views do not reflect how Internet users behave. In a 2019
Pew survey, seventy-nine percent of Americans said they are
concerned about how companies are using their data and eightyone percent of Americans said they believe the risks of data
collection outweigh the benefits.60 Another survey by the Center on
Data Innovation found that about eighty percent of Americans
would like companies like Facebook and Google to collect less of
their data, but that support wanes when they consider the tradeoffs.61 Most dramatically, support for less data collection dropped
by fifty-three percentage points when participants considered
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 12.
See Wilson, supra note 51, at 3.
See id.
See id.
See ABA Report, supra note 16.
See John Naughton, The Privacy Paradox: Why Do People Keep Using Tech Firms
(May
5,
2019,
2:00
AM),
that
Abuse
Their
Data?,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/05/privacy-paradox-whydo-people-keep-using-tech-firms-data-facebook-scandal
[https://perma.cc/NL2RVBUW].
60. See Auxier et al., supra note 19.
61. See Castro & McLaughlin, supra note 19.
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paying a monthly subscription fee in exchange for more data
privacy.62
The market supports the position that users do not care about
data privacy.63 In the wake of the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica
scandal, in which a whistleblower revealed that the analytics
company exploited data from Facebook users to influence the 2016
presidential election,64 Facebook saw an increase in users across
its platforms and in overall revenue.65 Applying this information to
the US antitrust framework, data privacy concerns could, in theory,
be a quality factor that courts consider when applying the
Consumer Welfare Standard.66 However, it is not clear that it has
enough of an effect on the market to gain a seat at the antitrust
table. As put by Tad Lipsky, a law professor and former
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) antitrust lawyer, privacy should stay
out of “the antitrust lane.”67
2. Antitrust Policy in Action
The privacy paradox notwithstanding, recent activity from
the DOJ Antitrust Division, the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, and
Congress indicate that data does, or at least should, play some role
in antitrust enforcement. Makan Delrahim, the former Assistant
Attorney General who headed the DOJ Antitrust Division under the
Trump administration, said that it is a “grave mistake to believe
that privacy concerns can never play a role in antitrust analysis,”
and compared personal data to the “oil” of the digital economy.68
62. Id.
63. See Naughton, supra note 59.
64. See Terry Gross, Whistleblower Explains How Cambridge Analytica Helped Fuel
U.S.
‘Insurgency’,
NPR
(Oct.
8,
2019,
2:45
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/768216311/whistleblower-explains-howcambridge-analytica-helped-fuel-u-s-insurgency?t=1647368672606
[https://perma.cc/N4R9-N6Q7]; see also Alvin Chang, The Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica Scandal, Explained With a Simple Diagram, VOX (May 2, 2018, 3:25 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/23/17151916/facebook-cambridgeanalytica-trump-diagram [https://perma.cc/WD64-AJEX].
65. See Naughton, supra note 59.
66. See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 55.
67. See id. at 82.
68. Tony Romm, DOJ Issues New Warning to Big Tech: Data and Privacy Could Be
POST
(Nov.
8.
2019,
3:22
PM),
Competition
Concerns,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/08/doj-issues-latest-warningbig-tech-data-privacy-could-be-competition-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/VHS5-DF77].
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The DOJ has been reviewing Google’s acquisition of Fitbit,
which closed in 2021 after approval from EU regulators.69 The
merger provides Google with access to Fitbit users’ personal data,
including health information.70 This is worrisome because Google
could use the newly acquired data to further solidify its dominant
position in the search advertising market.71 Although the merger
has finalized, the DOJ has yet to conclude its probe into the matter
and could still bring an enforcement action to attempt to
disentangle the two companies.72
Generally, courts will block a merger only if the two
companies are competitors within the same market.73 Here, Google
and Fitbit are not competitors—Google occupies the search and
search advertising markets74 while Fitbit occupies the wearable
tech or fitness tracker market.75 Even though Google makes a
smartwatch with fitness tracking functionality,76 it does not
possess market power in the wearable tech market and it did not
gain dominance through its acquisition of Fitbit.77 Therefore, the
69. See Dave Sebastian, Google Proceeds with Fitbit Deal, but Government Reviews
Continue, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2021, 12:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/googlecloses-fitbit-deal-surviving-regulatory-scrutiny-11610636698 [https://perma.cc/5Q2DJYTG].
70. See id.
71. The DOJ sued Google in 2020, alleging that it had unlawfully maintained a
monopoly in the search and search advertising markets. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just.,
Justice Department Sues Monopolist Google for Violating Antitrust Law (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violatingantitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/PN68-WUX8].
72. See Alyse F. Stach et al., The Thin Line Between Privacy and Antitrust, IAPP (June
23,
2020),
https://iapp.org/news/a/the-thin-line-between-privacy-and-antitrust/
[https://perma.cc/3AMZ-T7MZ].
73. See, e.g., United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 136 (D. Del. 2020)
(declining to enjoin Sabre’s acquisition of Farelogix because the DOJ failed to determine
the relevant market).
74. See Joseph Johnson, Global Market Share of Search Engines 2010-2022, STATISTA
(Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-shareof-search-engines/ [https://perma.cc/EF85-RXZ9].
75. See John Koetsier, Global Smartwatch Market: Apple 34%, Huawei 8%, Samsung
(May
27,
2021,
1:28
PM),
8%,
Fitbit
4.2%,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2021/05/27/global-smartwatch-marketapple-34-huawei-8-samsung-8-fitbit-42/?sh=270aae2166c7 (finding that, although Apple
has a dominate market share in the global smartwatch market with thirty-four percent,
Fitbit is still a contender in the market).
76. See WEAR OS BY GOOGLE, https://wearos.google.com/#hands-free-help
[https://perma.cc/2ZDU-BW47] (last visited May 4, 2021).
77. See Stach et al., supra note 72.
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merger was likely not anticompetitive. The DOJ, however, might
still decide to challenge the merger using a competition theory,
arguing that the merger strengthened Google’s monopoly in the
search advertising market.78
While the DOJ has been at the forefront of the United States’
battle with Google, the FTC has generally played a larger role in the
big tech antitrust field. In 2018, the FTC held a series of hearings
on competition and consumer protection in the twenty-first
century,79 with focus on privacy, big data, and competition.80
Additionally, in 2019, the FTC launched the Technology Task Force,
later renamed the Technology Enforcement Division, within the
Bureau of Competition.81 The Technology Enforcement Division
specifically focuses on “technology-related sectors of the economy,
including markets in which online platforms compete.”82 Following
a Technology Enforcement Division investigation, the FTC sued
Facebook at the end of 2020, alleging that it maintained its
monopoly through illegal conduct.83 In its complaint, the FTC
implicated data privacy when alleging the ways in which Facebook
illegally maintained its dominant position.84 For example, the FTC

78. The European Union signed off on the Google/Fitbit merger with the condition
that Google cannot use the Fitbit data for advertising purposes. See Sam Schechner, Google
Must Silo Fitbit Data, EU Says, Clearing $2.1 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2020, 10:33
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-must-silo-fitbit-data-eu-says-clearing-2-1billion-deal-11608219201 [https://perma.cc/C9RH-P765]. This condition is in place so
that Google cannot use the merger to gain dominance in the search advertising market. Id.
The DOJ could use the European approach as a guide to its own action.
79. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Hearings on Competition
and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (June 20, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2018/06/ftc-announces-hearings-competition-consumerprotection-21st [https://perma.cc/9R7H-8TJM].
80. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Agenda for Sixth Session
of Its Hearing on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/10/ftc-announces-agendasixth-session-its-hearings-competition [https://perma.cc/FV7L-9PRC].
81. See Patricia Galvan & Krisha Cerilli, What’s in a Name? Ask the Technology
Enforcement Division, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2019, 1:59 PM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2019/10/whats-nameask-technology-enforcement-division [https://perma.cc/VAE8-NJ9P].
82. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task
Force to Monitor Technology Markets (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/news/press-releases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-forcemonitor-technology-markets [https://perma.cc/P495-EY97].
83. See FTC Complaint, supra note 30.
84. See id.; see also infra Section IV.A.
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claimed that Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp deprived users
who value data privacy of meaningful choice in the market.85
Complementing the investigations and enforcement actions
taken by the executive branch, Congress is considering ways to
bring US antitrust laws into the twenty-first century. In 2020, the
Antitrust Subcommittee of the House of Representatives’ Judiciary
Committee released a majority staff report entitled “Investigation
of Competition in Digital Markets.”86 The report highlighted two
ways that privacy and data protection affect platform market
power. On one hand, erosion of consumer privacy is equivalent to
a monopolist decreasing quality of a product or increasing price.87
On the other hand, dominant firms could weaponize privacy in a
way that hurts potential competitors.88
The report then goes on to suggest how Congress can amend
legislation to address modern antitrust concerns.89 Several of the
recommendations involve regulating the ways that firms can use
data. Two of the suggestions are structural separations and line of
business restrictions to reduce conflicts of interest.90 Structural
separations would prevent dominant firms from using their
intermediary role to gatekeep the data they collect—for example,
the data Facebook collects from users that it shares with third
parties. Line of business restrictions would prevent dominant
firms from exploiting data from third parties to enter a new
market.91 Such proposals have historical precedent. For example,
Congress in the 1890s imposed line of business restrictions on
railroads by preventing them from “transporting any goods that
they had produced or in which they held an interest.”92 At the time,
Congress was concerned about common carrier railroads
expanding into the coal market.93 A congressional investigation
found that railroads were undermining independent coal miners
85. See id. at ¶ 127.
86. See SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. AND ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS (2020) [hereinafter House
Report].
87. See id. at 51-52.
88. See id. at 53.
89. See id. at 376-405.
90. See id. at 378.
91. See id. at 379.
92. Id. at 380.
93. Id.
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by deprioritizing the transport of coal mined by smaller companies
to give themselves an advantage.94 In response, Congress passed a
law that prohibited “railroads from transporting any goods that
they had produced or in which they held an interest,” thereby
restricting the lines of business in which the railroads could
participate.95 This is analogous to the line of business restrictions
proposed in the report. Just as Congress prevented railroads from
entering and manipulating the coal industry, the proposal would
prevent collectors of data from entering and manipulating new
markets by misappropriating data it collects from third parties that
rely on their platforms.
An additional suggestion in the report is a piece of legislation
that would require data portability, which would allow social
media users to move their personal data between social
networks.96 Such legislation would address the high switching
costs that arise when data cannot easily be moved from one
platform to the next. This suggestion also has historical precedent.
It is similar to an existing FCC rule allowing telephone users to keep
their phone numbers when switching carriers.97
Since Congress released the report, members of both the
House and the Senate have introduced legislation focused on big
tech regulation. Senator Amy Klobuchar, the lead Democrat on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights, introduced the Competition and Antitrust Law
Enforcement Reform Act in 2021.98 The bill aims to strengthen
prohibitions against anticompetitive mergers and prevent harmful

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 386.
97. See Porting: Keeping Your Phone Numbers When You Change Providers, FED. COMM.
COMM’N (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/porting-keeping-yourphone-number-when-you-change-providers [https://perma.cc/Z3Z4-2JJY]. The FCC
mandates local number portability, which allows a telephone user to keep their phone
number even if they change carriers. Id. Data portability, as suggested by the House Report,
would allow easy data transfer between websites, which would benefit both companies
and individual internet users.
98. See Press Release, Amy Klobuchar, Senator, Senator Klobuchar Introduces
Sweeping Bill to Promote Competition and Improve Antitrust Enforcement (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/senator-klobucharintroduces-sweeping-bill-to-promote-competition-and-improve-antitrust-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/3ZXQ-PCAU]; Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act
of 2021, S. 225, 117th Cong. (2021).
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dominant firm conduct, two areas in which tech companies have
exploited data to engage in potentially illegal activities.99 Senator
Klobuchar also introduced the Social Media Privacy Protection and
Consumer Rights Act of 2021.100 The bipartisan bill, which includes
provisions that mandate user control over data collection and user
notification after data breaches,101 has the potential to be the
American GDPR.102 Additionally, a violation of the bill’s privacy
requirements would be considered an unfair or deceptive act or
practice under the FTC Act, which would give the FTC jurisdiction
to sanction a social media company for inappropriately using
consumers’ data.103 Although it does not affect US antitrust law, the
Social Media Privacy and Consumer Rights Act would solidify the
idea that data privacy is a consumer welfare concern that courts
should be considering when engaging in an antitrust analysis.
Lawmakers have also introduced a series of bills that take aim
at Facebook, Apple, Google, and Amazon104. The proposals, which
do not name those four companies but purportedly only apply to
those four companies,105 tackle antitrust issues directly.106 They
include measures that would “make it easier to break up
businesses that used their dominance in one area to get a
stronghold in another, create new hurdles for acquisitions of

99. See id.
100. Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2021, S. 1167,
117th Cong. (2021).
101. See Press Release, John Kennedy, Senator, Kennedy, Klobuchar Introduce Bill to
Protect
Privacy
of
Consumers’
Online
Data
(May
20,
2021),
https://www.kennedy.senate.gov/public/2021/5/kennedy-klobuchar-introduce-bill-toprotect-privacy-of-consumers-online-data [https://perma.cc/KVH3-4HJX].
102. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 27, art. 33 (requiring notification in case of data
breach); GDPR, supra note 27, art. 6 (stating that consent is needed to process personal
data).
103. Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2021, S. 1167,
117th Cong. (2021).
104. See Kang, supra note 21; see also American Innovation and Choice Online Act,
H.R. 3816, 117th Cong. (2021); Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021, H.R.
3826, 117th Cong. (2021); Ending Platform Monopolies Act, H.R. 3825, 117th Cong.
(2021); Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching
(ACCESS) Act, H.R. 3849, 117th Cong. (2021); Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2021,
H.R. 3843, 117th Cong. (2021). For more information about each bill, see JAY B. SYKES, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R46875, B 11 (Aug. 13, 2021).
105. See SYKES, supra note 104, at 3.
106. See Kang, supra note 21.
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nascent rivals, and empower regulators with more funds to police
companies.”107
In sum, Congress passed US antitrust laws long before data
and data privacy concerns were relevant market factors. While the
DOJ and the FTC are beginning to consider data and data privacy in
their antitrust investigations and enforcement actions, it is unclear
if these arguments hold weight under the current laws. This is
particularly true in enforcement actions to stop mergers. The
House report states: “It is unclear whether the antitrust agencies
are presently equipped to block anticompetitive mergers in digital
markets.”108 Congress, however, is beginning to consider how it
can update antitrust laws to better manage the concerns that arise
in the digital economy, including data and data privacy.109
Although it is unclear if legislation will be passed,110 the proposals
provide the United States with the opportunity to implement
necessary change at a time when there is bipartisan support to
update its antiquated laws.
B.

Competition in the European Union: The Tale of Two
Frameworks

While antitrust enforcement in the United States falls to every
vertical and horizonal branch of its federalist government—
Congress, two administrative agencies, federal courts, and state
Attorneys General—the European Union’s administrative law
system consolidates their antitrust enforcement.111 The EU’s
competition laws are found in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).112 Though
comparable, the Treaty differs from the Sherman Act in that it is
107. Id.
108. House Report, supra note 86, at 387.
109. See SYKES, supra note 104.
110. See Lauren Feiner, 2022 Will be the ‘Do or Die’ Moment for Congress to Take
Action
Against
Big
Tech,
CNBC
(Dec.
31,
2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/31/2022-will-be-the-do-or-die-moment-for-congressto-take-action-against-big-tech.html [https://perma.cc/K5EF-ZFVU].
111. James Keyte, Why the Atlantic Divide on Monopoly/Dominance Law and
INST.
(2018),
Enforcement
is
So
Difficult
to
Bridge,
ANTITRUST
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/fall18-keyte.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WXU3-VLRM].
COMMISSION,
112. See
EUROPEAN
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html
[https://perma.cc/W76B-J98B] (last visited May 3, 2021).
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more specific in some areas and broader in others.113 Article 101
parallels Section 1 of the Sherman Act, prohibiting agreements that
restrict trade.114 Article 102 is akin to Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
but outlaws holding a “dominant position” instead of proscribing
“monopolization.”115 However, Articles 101 and 102 proscribe
specific conduct,116 while the Sherman Act uses the unspecific
word “every.”117 Further, the “dominant position” prohibited in
Article 102 encompasses more than the American understanding
of a monopoly.118 The European Commission (“EC”), the executive
body of the European Union, is the “investigator, prosecutor, and
decision maker” of competition enforcement,119 which includes
enforcement under Articles 101 and 102 and review of mergers
and acquisitions.120 Unlike the US FTC and DOJ, the EC does not
need to go to court to impose penalties or other remedies121 and is
also given broad discretion to make policy decisions.122
The EC differs from the United States in its approach to
handling competition within the digital economy. Up until now, the
United States has tried to handle modern problems with decadesold laws and enforcement mechanisms. The European Union, by
contrast, is less reticent about tackling the issues explicitly and
head-on. The EC has a competition agency that is headed by
Margrethe Vestager, the “Executive Vice-President for A Europe Fit
for the Digital Age and Competition.”123 Vestager’s responsibilities
include “[s]trengthening the enforcement of, and reviewing, EU
competition rules.”124 She does more than approve mergers and
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See Keyte, supra note 111.
TFEU, supra note, 23, art. 101.
TFEU, supra note 23, art. 102.
See TFEU, supra note 23, arts. 101-102.
15 U.S.C. § 1
Id.
Keyte, supra note 111.
See Robert Snelders & Michele Piergiovanni, European Union, CLEARY GOTTLIEB
(July
30,
2004),
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organizearchive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/european-union-merger-control.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4R7N-XWSB].
121. Keyte, supra note 111.
122. See id.
COMM'N,
123. See
Margrethe
Vestager,
EUR.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/vestager_en
[https://perma.cc/48W6-5F7T] (last visited May 4, 2021). In 2019, Vestager’s job title was
changed from “Commissioner of Competition” to explicitly include digital considerations.
124. Id.

2022]

DISTRUST & ANTITRUST

891

break up monopolies—which are two tasks that a competition
enforcer often undertakes. Her job also encompasses
“[c]oordinating work on a European strategy on data” and working
on the new Digital Services Act.125
Data concerns are beginning to influence Europe’s antitrust
enforcement. In a March 2021 speech entitled “Competition in a
Digital Economy,” Vestager said that “the privacy of millions of
people is at stake” if states do not regulate technology
monopolies.126 This commitment to privacy played an important
role in the European Union approving the Google/Fitbit merger.
One of the conditions of the merger was that Google promised “not
to use Fitbit data for advertising purposes in Europe, and to store
such data separate from any other Google data used in ads.”127 The
EC has also launched several investigations into Facebook’s use of
data to engage in anticompetitive conduct,128 and has not shied
away from brining formal charges in the big tech space.129 Europe,
however, is learning that there are still many unanswered
questions about the relationship between competition and data
privacy.
In fact, the European Union arguably has a more complicated
road ahead than the United States. While the United States is
working within an old framework, Europe must balance its
competition regulation and enforcement with the GDPR.130 Passed
in 2018, the GDPR has been dubbed the “Magna Carta of data
protection.”131 The regulation does not touch on competition
directly, but competition law and the GDPR are clearly

125. Id.
126. Margrethe Vestager, Exec. Vice President, A Eur. Fit for the Digital Age,
Competition in a Digital Age, Address at European Internet Forum (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/20192024/vestager/announcements/competition-digital-age_en
[https://perma.cc/P3S4G5C7].
127. Schechner, supra note 78.
128. Schechner et al., supra note 30; see also, infra Section IV.B.
129. For example, the EC has formally charged Amazon for allegedly exploiting data
for improper benefits. See Alina Selyukh, Amazon Faces Antitrust Charges from European
Regulators,
NPR
(Nov.
10,
2020,
8:56
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/10/879643610/amazon-faces-antitrust-charges-fromeuropean-regulators [https://perma.cc/SC4Y-3JWH].
130. See GDPR, supra note 27.
131. Michal S. Gal & Oshrit Aviv, The Competitive Effects of the GDPR, 16 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 349, 349 (2020).
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complementary. For example, the GDPR includes the right to data
portability.132 Data portability, which was a factor in the US House
report,133 is considered a procompetitive measure because it
theoretically empowers consumers to choose among competing
providers by lowering switching costs.134 In 2019, the EC published
a report called “Competition Policy for the Digital Era” (“EU
Report”).135 The report includes a chapter on data, which tries to
grapple with the relationship between the two distinct, but
interconnected, legal fields. The report clarifies when data privacy
concerns trigger competition laws.136 For example, data sharing
triggers Article 101 when it amounts to exclusionary conduct.137
While data sharing can often result in efficiencies in the market,138
it can become anticompetitive when, for example, companies share
“commercially sensitive information such as costs or prices,”
because such information sharing can lead to collusion.139 Data
sharing can also be anticompetitive if it dissuades competitors
from improving their own data collection practices.140
Additionally, the EU Report provides a framework for when a
dominant firm has an affirmative duty to grant access to data under
Article 102.141
However, the EU Report also acknowledges the tension
between competition laws and the GDPR. It points out that while
access to data may be required under Article 102, it is subject to
limits found in the privacy law.142 It also acknowledges that the
GDPR is new and yet to be tested in the courts; therefore, there are
still open questions about how it interplays with competition

132. See W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAW. 221, 226
(2017).
133. See House Report, supra note 86, at 384.
134. See
Data
Portability,
Interoperability
and
Competition,
OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/data-portability-interoperability-andcompetition.htm [https://perma.cc/SPR7-SSJK].
135. JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA (European Union,
2019).
136. See id. at 91.
137. See id. at 94.
138. See id. at 94-96.
139. Id. at 96.
140. Id. at 97.
141. See id. at 98.
142. See id. at 108.
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law.143 For example, the GDPR requires users to affirmatively
consent to a company collecting their data,144 but there is currently
an outstanding question about whether existence of a dominant
position is relevant for assessing the validity of consent.145
Over the last several years, the European Union has been
particularly proactive in its approach to regulations in the digital
age. Through the GDPR, it has codified its commitment to digital
privacy.146 It has also acknowledged that, while data concerns and
competition are often complements, there are areas where data
privacy and competition regulation are incompatible. The EC has
also proposed two pieces of legislation, the Digital Markets Act and
the Digital Services Act, which would function jointly with
competition and privacy law to effectively regulate large tech
companies.147 In summary, Europe seems to be creating a
comprehensive regulatory scheme fit for the digital economy, but
there will likely be bumps in the road ahead.
C.

Competition in Germany: Little Yet Fierce

Germany is a member of the European Union and is therefore
subject to EU competition and privacy schemes. However, it is also
forging on its own path when it comes to regulating competition in
the digital age. The German Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”),
Bundeskartellamt, recently amended the German Competition
Act148 by passing the Digital Competition Act.149 The reform aims

143. See id. at 77.
144. See id. at 79.
145. See Christopher Ritzer & Tim Schaper, Germany’s Federal Supreme Court
Provisionally Confirms Facebook’s Use of Personal Data Is Alleged Abuse of Dominant Market
PROTECTION
REPORT
(July
16.
2020),
Position,
DATA
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2020/07/germanys-federal-supreme-courtprovisionally-confirms-facebooks-use-of-personal-data-is-alleged-abuse-of-dominantmarket-position/ [https://perma.cc/Y8V3-QVWD].
146. See GDPR, supra note 27.
147. See Bart Van den Brande, The Future Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act
(Jan.
4,
2021),
in
a
Nutshell,
LEXOLOGY
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5d279269-9218-48dd-b33b42f01676369e [https://perma.cc/LB6R-2FJH].
148. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restrains of
Competition], June 26, 2013, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] (Ger.).
149. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act to Amend the
Competition Act to Achieve a Focused, Proactive, and Digital Competition Law 4.0 and
Other Provisions], Jan. 19, 2021, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL I] (Ger.).
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to end abuse of dominant market power by improving regulation
of digital platforms.150 The original Competition Act defined
“dominant market power” as having at least forty percent of
market share.151 The Digital Competition Act adds a new Section
19(a) to the Competition Act, which would allow the FCO to
designate a company that holds a dominant market position as
having “paramount significance for competition across
markets.”152 If the FCO decides that a company has “paramount
significance for competition across markets,” it has the power to
impose certain restrictions.153 For example, FCO may prohibit a
company that has paramount significance from favoring its own
products, interfering with data portability, or product
interoperability among competitors.154 Data plays a role in how the
FCO decides if a company has paramount significance and it is
relevant in some of the restrictions that the Office could impose. In
terms of determining paramount significance, the FCO can
consider the dominant company’s access to data relevant to
competition.155 As to restrictions, the FCO could prohibit the
dominant company from leveraging data to create barriers to entry
into a market or restricting the portability of data.156
The Digital Competition Act also addresses access to data
directly. Like in the United States, obtaining a dominant position in
Germany is not unlawful unless the company abuses that
position.157 Under the Essential Facilities Doctrine,158 it may be an
abuse to refuse access to a network or other infrastructure that is
150. See Jenny Gesley, Germany: New Digital Competition Act Expands Abilities of
Competition Authorities to Regulate Abuse of Dominant Market Positions, LIBR. OF CONG.
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-new-digitalcompetition-act-expands-abilities-of-competition-authorities-to-regulate-abuse-ofdominant-market-positions/ [https://perma.cc/CN8D-D6GE].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. For a full list of restrictions, see id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Jones Day, Germany Adopts New Competition Rules for Tech Platforms, JONES
DAY (Jan. 2021), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2021/01/germany-adoptsnew-competition-rules [https://perma.cc/G627-43T4].
158. First developed in the United States in 1912, and later codified in European law
in the EC Treaty, the Essential Facilities Doctrine “imposes on owners of essential facilities
a duty to deal with competitors.” See Sébastien J. Evrard, Essential Facilities in the European
Union: Bronner and Beyond, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 491 (2004).
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necessary to compete.159 The Digital Competition Act characterizes
data as an essential facility, making it an unlawful abuse of a
dominant position to refuse to share data.160 The amended Act also
includes a right to access data from companies with “relative
market power,” which means that a company without dominant
market power may be obligated to share data with another
company that is dependent on its data.161 Andreas Mundt, the
President of the FCO, has said that explicitly adding data to the
Essential Facilities Doctrine is important, but “not revolutionary,”
since the European Essential Facilities Doctrine presumably does
not exclude data.162 However, the EU Report suggests that access
to data cases should be analyzed outside of the established
framework of the Essential Facilities Doctrine.163 While the EC
agrees that access to data is important in regulating competition,
the two jurisdictions will likely split in their analysis of when data
access is required.
Data concerns have also been relevant in Germany’s recent
enforcement actions. In 2019, the FCO launched an investigation
against Facebook, finding that the company was abusing its
dominant position based on how it collects, merges, and uses data
from Facebook-owned services and third-party websites.164 More
recently, a group of German media and advertising companies filed
a complaint with the FCO against Apple, again highlighting the
tension between competition and privacy.165 The complaint alleges
that Apple’s new privacy update166 is anticompetitive because it
159. See Day, supra note 157.
160. See Oliver Fleischmann et al., New Antitrust Rules for the Digital Economy:
German “Digitalization Act” Nears the Finish Line, JD SUPRA (Dec. 14, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-antitrust-rules-for-the-digital-53319/
[https://perma.cc/PK8C-WH7P].
161. See id.
162. See ABA Report, supra note 16, at 102.
163. See CRÉMER ET AL., supra note 135, at 98.
164. See Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from
(July
2,
2019)
Different
Sources,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019
/07_02_2019_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/RZ89-WWK3]; see also infra Section IV.C.
165. See Jack Denton, Apple Slapped with Antitrust Complaint in Germany over New
(Apr.
26,
2021,
1:00
PM),
iPhone
Privacy
Settings,
MARKETWATCH
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/apple-slapped-with-antitrust-complaint-ingermany-over-new-iphone-privacy-settings-11619456399
[https://perma.cc/7BBKMQYY].
166. See supra Part I.
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prevents competitors from processing commercially relevant
data.167 Rejecting this claim, Apple invoked the GDPR, which holds
that data privacy is a human right.168 The FCO has since initiated a
formal proceeding against Apple to determine whether the
company is of paramount significance.169 If the FCO finds that
Apple is of paramount significance, it will have authority to impose
restrictions on the company.170
III. FACEBOOK: A CASE STUDY
A.

FTC Lawsuit

Facebook provides insight into the future of data-driven
competition enforcement in the United States, the European Union,
and Germany. All three jurisdictions have independently initiated
antitrust actions against the company that implicate its data
practices. Given the varying laws in the jurisdictions, the results of
these actions are likely to differ.
In the United States, the complaint by the FTC highlighted
three main ways in which Facebook’s allegedly anticompetitive
conduct implicates data and data privacy concerns: using data to
make decisions about acquisitions; acquiring competitors, thereby
depriving social media users of the possibility of finding an
alternative social network that meets their data privacy needs; and
withholding user data from third parties as a condition to a noncompete.171
First, the complaint discusses Facebook’s 2013 acquisition of
Onavo, a user surveillance company that tracked users’ online
activity.172 Facebook used the data from Onavo to track the growth
167. See German Business Groups File Complaint Over Apple Privacy Settings, REUTERS
(Apr. 26, 2021, 5:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/technology/german-businessgroups-file-complaint-over-apple-privacy-settings-2021-04-26/.
168. See id.
169. Proceeding Against Apple Based on New Rules for Large Digital Companies
(Section 19a(1) GWB) – Bundeskartellamt Examines Apple’s Significance for Competition
(June
21,
2021),
Across
Markets,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2021
/21_06_2021_Apple.html;jsessionid=7B9230A197564073881C648DC3569D59.1_cid378
[https://perma.cc/2DLA-5DLM]
170. See Gesley, supra note 150.
171. See FTC Complaint, supra note 30.
172. See id. ¶ 74.
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and popularity of other apps, thereby helping Facebook “‘make
strategic acquisitions’” of potential competitors.173 Facebook shut
down Onavo in 2019, but still uses data “to track and evaluate
potential competitive threats.”174 Next, the complaint discusses
Facebook’s 2012 acquisition of Instagram,175 a nascent
competitor,176 and its 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp,177 a company
that was particularly successful at the time in Asia and Europe and
had begun to gain traction in the United States.178 The complaint
alleges that Facebook’s acquisition of these competitors “deprives
users of the benefits of competition,”179 including choice in privacy
protection options.180 WhatsApp in particular had a “strong focus
on the protection of user privacy [that] would offer a distinctively
valuable option for many users” had it not been acquired by
Facebook.181 Finally, the complaint discusses the conditions that
Facebook imposed on third-party app developers in order to gain
access to valuable application programming interfaces (“APIs”).182
APIs provide the third parties with critical user data, such as the
user’s friend list.183 Access to this data could be integral to an app’s
success, but Facebook has limited access to only those app
developers that agree to neither compete with Facebook nor
promote competitors of Facebook.184
In June 2021, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia granted Facebook’s motion to dismiss but invited the
FTC to amend its complaint.185 In its written opinion, the court
stated that it “does not agree with all of Facebook’s contentions,”
but agreed that the FTC did not adequately establish in its
complaint that Facebook actually had monopoly power in the

173. Id. ¶ 75.
174. Id.
175. See id. ¶ 95
176. See id. ¶ 91.
177. See id. ¶ 121.
178. See id. ¶ 114.
179. Id. ¶ 105.
180. See id. ¶ 42.
181. Id. ¶ 127.
182. See id. ¶ 22.
183. See id. ¶ 130.
184. See id. ¶ 136.
185. See FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-3590 JEB, 2021 WL 26433627, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
June 28, 2021).
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relevant market.186 The FTC had properly defined the market—
Personal Social Networking Services187—but failed to establish
Facebook’s market share.188 In its analysis, the court underscored
the challenges of defining market share in a data-driven
industry.189
Traditionally, one way of calculating market share is by
considering a company’s total annual revenue.190 However, total
revenue does not accurately represent market share when the
revenue is earned in a different market than the market in which
the anticompetitive conduct is alleged. Here, Facebook earns its
money through data-driven digital advertising. Since the company
is not directly profiting from the users of its Personal Social
Networking Services—meaning that the users are not paying for
access to the service—its annual revenue is not the correct metric
to determine its share of the Personal Social Networking Services
market.191 Hence, Facebook’s revenue in the digital advertising
market does not represent its share of the Personal Social
Networking Services market.
The FTC did not directly address this revenue issue in its
amended complaint, but it did consider Facebook’s data practices.
The FTC contended that Facebook’s use and misuse of personal
data demonstrates its market power.192 The complaint points to
two previous Consent Orders that Facebook had agreed to after the
FTC charged the company with engaging in user privacy abuses,
including the Cambridge Analytica scandal.193 According to the
FTC, these incidents prove that Facebook has market power given
its “ability to harm users by decreasing product quality, without
losing significant user engagement.”194 The court has not yet
accepted the FTC’s theory that data privacy is an appropriate
consumer welfare concern to consider in an antitrust analysis, but
the outcome will be significant to the ongoing debate.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at *1.
See id. at *12.
See id.
See id. at *13.
See id.
See id.
See Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 2020) at ¶ 206.
Id. ¶ 205-06.
Id. ¶ 206.
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European Commission Facebook Investigations

Facebook is also the subject of antitrust investigations in the
European Union. In 2019, the EC launched a probe into Facebook
seeking documents related to the company’s alleged leveraging of
user data to stifle competition.195 This preliminary investigation,
which implicated the Onavo acquisition referenced in the FTC
complaint, has not currently led to any official action against the
company.196 More recently, in 2021 the EC opened another
antitrust investigation against Facebook involving its use of data
collected from advertisers.197 The EC is considering whether
Facebook has an unfair competitive advantage in the online
classified ads sector—a place where Facebook competes with
companies from which it collects data.198 The 2021 investigation is
based on a theory that starkly differs from US antitrust laws:
whether Facebook’s actions are harming companies in the online
classified ads sector.199 There is no indication, however, that
Facebook has a monopoly in this sector. In the United States, to
make a successful claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
defendant company must have monopoly power in the industry
that is allegedly being harmed.200 Therefore, even if the EC finds
that Facebook committed actionable harm, a similar investigation
likely would not lead to an antitrust action in the United States,
unless the government can establish that Facebook has monopoly
power in the online classified ads market.
C.

German Facebook Action

One of the first actions that Germany has taken under its new
Digital Competition Act is an investigation into the relationship
between Oculus, Facebook’s virtual reality products, and its social

195. Schechner et al., supra note 30.
196. Id.
197. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation into
Possible
Anticompetitive
Conduct
of
Facebook
(June
4,
2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2848
[https://perma.cc/8PCD-VHP8].
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Competition and Monopoly, supra note 48.
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networking sites.201 While this investigation does not necessary
implicate data privacy concerns on its face, Facebook privacy
practices have been condemned by the FCO under the general
German Competition Act.202 The FCO action against Facebook,
which found that Facebook is using its data practices to abuse its
dominant position, is still ongoing.203 In 2019, the FCO imposed
restrictions on how Facebook may process data, allowing the
company to continue to collect it, but mandating that Facebook not
assign the data to an individual user’s account unless it receives the
user’s consent.204 Andrea Mundt, President of the FCO, said that the
decision is the first step toward a future where “Facebook will no
longer be allowed to force its users to agree to the practically
unrestricted collection and assigning of non-Facebook data to their
Facebook user accounts.”205
While German competition laws are similar to US antitrust
laws in certain respects, the FCO action looks very different from
the FTC lawsuit against Facebook. In both Germany and the United
States, a company must have a dominant share of the relevant
market to be held liable for anticompetitive conduct, but the
measurement system is different. In determining that Facebook
has a dominant position in the social networking market, the FCO
looked at the number of Facebook’s daily and monthly users, and
found that Facebook has a market share of more than ninety-five
percent of daily active users and more than eighty percent of
monthly active users.206 In the FTC lawsuit against Facebook, the
United States District Court decided that “[p]ercent of ‘daily users
[or] monthly users’ of PSN services” was an inaccurate
measurement of market share.207 Therefore, if the United States
201. Matthias Inverardi, German Cartel Office Extends Probe of Ties Between Facebook
and Oculus, REUTERS, (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/technology/germancartel-office-extends-probe-ties-between-facebook-oculus-2021-01-28/
[https://perma.cc/GWR2-K3AK].
202. See German Facebook Enforcement, supra note 30.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. FTC v. Facebook, 2021 WL 26433627 at *13. The court stated that the percent of
users of PSN services was an inaccurate measure of market share because that number
could misstate “any one firm’s market share depending on the various proportions of users
who have accounts of multiple services, not to mention how often users visit each service
and for how long.”
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judicial system does eventually determine that Facebook has
market power, it will likely do so using a different measurement
than the one used in Germany.
The FCO action also differs from the FTC lawsuit in how the
leading agencies defined the harm. In Germany, the FCO
determined that Facebook’s data practice “constitutes an abuse of
a dominant position.”208 According to the FCO, the actionable harm
was that users suffered due to Facebook’s collection of their
data.209 On the other hand, the FTC focuses on harm to
competitors.210 In the eyes of the FTC, Facebook’s primary
transgressions were predatory business practices that ultimately
deprived users of meaningful choice in the market.211 While data
practices were mentioned in the FTC complaint, their relevance
was merely tangential. Both German and U.S. regulatory agencies
have accused Facebook of anticompetitive conduct,212 but the
company will like use two very different strategies in the two
jurisdictions considering the unique nature of both complaints.
After the FCO ruling, Facebook filed a timely appeal
questioning the legality of the data restrictions.213 While that
lawsuit progresses, the restrictions remain in effect.214 Germany’s
Higher Regional Court expressed concern with Facebook’s data
collection practice but announced that it will receive advice from
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) before issuing a decision on
the restriction’s legality.215 Specifically, the German court has
posed seven questions to the ECJ about the application and content

208. German Facebook Enforcement, supra note 30.
209. See id.
210. FTC Complaint, supra note 30, at ¶¶ 77-79.
211. Id.
212. See supra Section III.A, Section III.C.
213. See Inverardi, surpa note 33.
214. See Christopher Ritzer & Tim Schaper, Germany’s Federal Supreme Court
Provisionally Confirms Facebook’s Use of Personal Data Is Alleged Abuse of Dominant Market
PROTECTION
REPORT
(July
16,
2020),
Position,
DATA
https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2020/07/germanys-federal-supreme-courtprovisionally-confirms-facebooks-use-of-personal-data-is-alleged-abuse-of-dominantmarket-position/ [https://perma.cc/8UMT-Z8C3].
215. See id.
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of the GDPR,216 which Germany has adopted.217 The FCO action has
the potential to be groundbreaking, but its fate is beyond the
German government’s control.
IV. THE FUTURE OF BIG TECH COMPETITION REGULATION
As the world navigates competition regulation in the digital
economy, there is no one path forward. However, Europe is
somewhat more equipped than the United States to take on big
tech’s monopolistic practices. One reason why is because the
European Union can better address actions that have harmed or
are likely to harm a secondary market. In the United States, for
most antitrust actions to be successful, the plaintiff must establish
a common relevant market shared between the parties.218 This
requirement prevents US antitrust enforcers from challenging a lot
of potentially harmful conduct in the digital economy. For example,
for a US agency to be successful in an antitrust action against
Facebook, it must prove, in part, that Facebook’s actions harmed
other Personal Social Networking Services. A court will not care
how Facebook’s actions harmed companies in a secondary market,
like the digital advertising sector, unless the government can prove
that Facebook also has a monopoly in that market.
The limitations of the US approach to antitrust actions are
demonstrated by both the Google/Fitbit merger219 and the EC’s
investigation into Facebook’s data practices in the classified ads
sector.220 On its face, the Google/Fitbit merger is harmless because
the two companies do not occupy the same market. However, the
merger has the potential to be anticompetitive because it provides
Google with millions of additional datapoints that it can use to
216. See Reemt Matthiesen & Björn Herbers, ECJ to Issue Preliminary Ruling on
(Apr.
18,
2021),
German
FCO-Facebook
Case,
LEXOLOGY
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e4e57715-55e6-4559-ae923ec63669a6a0 [https://perma.cc/5DWS-NP3J]
217. See Kurth, supra note 29.
218. See Jonathan Gleklen, Comments of the American Bar Association Antitrust Law
Section and International Law Section on the European Commission’s Consultation on the
Draft Revised Regulation on Vertical Agreements and Vertical Guidelines, A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.
SECTION
(Sept.
16,
2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/comme
nts/september-2021/comments-eu-91621.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEU7-NAA7].
219. See infra Section II.A.2.
220. See infra Section III.B.
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solidify its monopoly in the search advertising market. The EC
addressed this issue by conditioning the merger, forbidding Google
from accessing the Fitbit data for advertising purposes. If the
United States does eventually decide to act against the merger, the
judicial system will be unable to step in unless the DOJ can
establish a relevant market between the two companies. Since the
two companies do not share market power within a common
market, this is unlikely.221 The same could be said about the EC’s
probe into Facebook’s data practices in the classified ads sector. If
the probe does eventually result in sanctions, the United States is
unlikely to follow Europe’s lead unless it can define a relevant
market or prove direct harm to the online classified ads sector.
Europe also has an advantage over the United States because
it is decisive about data. European competition enforcers can
confidently use data privacy as a sword against big tech companies.
In the United States, it is still up for debate whether data privacy
concerns matter, and if so, in what capacity.222 While individual
states have passed data privacy laws,223 and private companies like
Apple have implemented data privacy policies,224 they have no
bearing on the outcome of federal antitrust actions.
Ultimately, EU regulations of competition in the digital
economy are not perfect. For example, there is tension among
competition laws, the GDPR, and the laws of individual Member
States, such as Germany. However, the United States can learn from
Europe as it attempts to regulate the tech industry. First, like
Europe, the United States needs a mechanism to address the harm
that a monopolist inflicts onto a secondary market. Second, the
United States needs a federal response to data privacy concerns.
The DOJ and the FTC are unlikely to stop acting against companies
like Facebook and Google, but those actions cannot go far within
the current US antitrust framework.
The pieces of legislation that were brought in the House of
Representatives and the Senate in 2021 could address these
221. See infra Section II.A.2.
222. See Sydney Wolofsky, What’s Your Privacy Worth on the Global Tech Market?
Weighing the Cost of Protecting Consumer Data Against the Risk that New Legislation May
Stifle Competition and Innovation During this Global, Technological Revolution, 44 FORDHAM
INT’L L. J. 1149 (2021).
223. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 55 (A.B. 375)
(WEST).
224. See infra Part I.
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concerns.225 First, the Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement
Reform Act would allow enforcers to better protect secondary
markets by removing the current requirement that plaintiffs must
define a relevant market to establish liability.226 Such a change
would differently impact ongoing antitrust actions, like the probe
into the Google/Fitbit merger. As law, this provision would allow
enforcers to stop the Google/Fitbit merger using a similar theory
implemented by the European competition enforcers.227 Under
this new regime, the DOJ could step in to stop Google from
exploiting Fitbit user data for advertising purposes without
defining a common relevant market.
The second Senate bill, the Social Media Privacy and
Consumer Rights Act, would provide a federal response to the data
privacy consumer welfare debate.228 Although it does not address
antitrust concerns directly, if passed, it would codify the
contention that data privacy is a consumer welfare concern that
should be considered when analyzing harm to consumers in an
antitrust action. Such a measure would bring United States
antitrust enforcement more in line with antitrust enforcement in
the European Union.
The proposed legislation would do more than just open the
door to antitrust actions in different markets and codify data
privacy as a consumer welfare concern. For example, the proposed
bills would better regulate mergers undertaken by big tech firms,
require data portability, impose structural separation, and prevent
dominant firms from engaging in exclusionary conduct.229 The
legislation addresses many of the concerns found in the report
published by the House of Representatives’ Judiciary Committee
and would affect both ongoing and future antitrust actions. Right
now, America is ill-equipped to take on big tech, but if Congress can
act, its antitrust regime can take important steps in the right
direction.

225. See infra Part II.A.2.
226. See Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225,
117th Cong. (2021).
227. See Schechner et al., supra note 30.
228. See Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2021, S. Res.
1667, 117th Cong. § 1667 (2021).
229. See SYKES, supra note 104.
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V. CONCLUSION
It is indisputable that data and data privacy will play a large
role in competition enforcement in the coming years. While
government officials and legal scholars have been exploring the
relationship between the two fields in a mostly theoretical sense
up to now, enforcement agencies, courts, and legislative bodies
around the world are beginning to test the bounds in practice. US
enforcement agencies have implicated data and data privacy
concerns in its antitrust actions, but due to the country’s centuryold antitrust laws, it is unclear whether data-driven arguments will
hold up in court. In response to these concerns, Congress has
dedicated a significant amount of time in the new decade trying to
gain a better understanding of the digital economy with the goal of
passing legislation that formally addresses the challenges posed by
big tech. Legislation was introduced in the Senate, but so far, there
has been no further movement.
The European Union, on the other hand, does not have to
worry that its laws are too old to stand up to the current moment.
If the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act pass, Europe
will be equipped with brand new laws specifically designed to
regulate competition within the tech sector. However, the bloc
must strike a delicate balance between its competition laws and its
privacy laws. The GDPR solidifies data privacy as a human right,
but as the EC is learning, prioritizing privacy can sometimes
interfere with competitive markets. Germany, a member of the EU,
is taking on big tech within its own borders with its own newly
amended competition laws and its own enforcement actions, but it
is still ultimately reliant on the EC.
The United States, European Union, and Germany are all
currently testing out their big data antitrust strategies against a
common opponent: Facebook. While all three jurisdictions have
expressed concern over Facebook’s data practices, their
approaches to addressing the perceived problems vary. In their
actions against Facebook, the European Union and United States
have both focused their attention on the harm that Facebook’s data
practices are causing to competitors. Germany, on the other hand,
sanctioned Facebook based on harms to consumers directly.
However, it is still uncertain whether Germany’s action against
Facebook is consistent with the GDPR. Additionally, the actions in
the European Union and Germany concern Facebook’s data
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practices directly, while in the US FTC complaint, data issues are
merely tangential.
Finally, going forward, neither the United States nor the
European Union has a perfect antitrust framework. However, if the
United States wants to succeed in its current and future battles
against big tech, it can learn a couple things from Europe. First, the
United States needs to adjust its antitrust laws so that it can
sanction a monopolist for harms that affect a secondary market.
Second, the United States needs a federal policy to regulate data
privacy. Pending legislation in the United States House of
Representatives and the Senate would directly address these
issues and more. Whether it is against Facebook, Google, or a
company that currently only exists in someone’s imagination, the
United States is bound to have legal fights ahead of it. It is
important that it equips itself with the proper tools.

